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Abstract
The emerging marketplace for online free services in which service providers earn revenue from using consumer
data in direct and indirect ways has lead to significant privacy concerns. This leads to the following question: can
the online marketplace sustain multiple service providers (SPs) that offer privacy-differentiated free services? This
paper studies the problem of market segmentation for the free online services market by augmenting the classical
Hotelling model for market segmentation analysis to include the fact that for the free services market, a consumer
values service not in monetized terms but by its quality of service (QoS) and that the differentiator of services is
not product price but the privacy risk advertised by a SP. Building upon the Hotelling model, this paper presents
a parametrized model for SP profit and consumer valuation of service for both the two- and multi-SP problems to
show that: (i) when consumers place a high value on privacy, it leads to a lower use of private data by SPs (i.e.,
their advertised privacy risk reduces), and thus, SPs compete on the QoS; (ii) SPs that are capable of differentiating
on services that do not directly target consumers gain larger market share; and (iii) a higher valuation of privacy by
consumers forces SPs with smaller untargeted revenue to offer lower privacy risk to attract more consumers. The
work also illustrates the market segmentation problem for more than two SPs and highlights the instability of such
markets.
Keywords-free online services, privacy-differentiated services, quality of service, market segmentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a steady increase in online interactions between consumers and retailers, where the term retailers
refers to entities who sell or offer (for free) a product. In fact, many oft used online services are offered for
free and consumers implicitly accede to tracking for customized services. Targeted ads are a part of the emerging
revenue/profit model for such retailers, henceforth referred to as service providers (SPs), especially those offering
free services. Consumers are delighted by free services until they begin encountering privacy violations on a
daily/frequent basis. While such infractions taken individually could be ignored or discounted, the totality of data
available about consumers with a variety of retailers and the resulting privacy consequences raise serious concerns.
Service providers are beginning to acknowledge that consumers are sensitive to privacy violations. For example,
Google [1] and Apple [2] recently adopted differentially private mechanisms for collecting user data for statistical
analyses. However, the details of these mechanisms are opaque and offer even less clarity on whether the consumer
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actually has a choice. In this context, it is worth understanding if privacy-differentiated services can provide such
choices for consumers. In a competitive marketplace, the aggregate weight of targeting may drive some customers
to seek a more privacy-protective alternative. The cost to the consumer for this action may be a lower quality of
service (QoS) (e.g., poorer search engine capabilities). However, it could eventually lead to a more open model for
consumer sharing of private information, i.e., one from implicit assent to informed consent.
In this paper, we identify and formalize conditions under which privacy-differentiated services are sustainable
and examine when competition based on privacy protections could lead to a sustainable marketplace for online
free services. As a hypothetical running example we posit a marketplace with two search engines Google Search
and DuckDuckGo. The former tracks searches by users thereby offering higher quality service (QoS) (e.g., search
accuracy) while the latter explicitly does no tracking and may offer a relatively lower QoS. More generally, our
model allows differentiating SPs by their QoS and privacy-sensitive offerings to determine the existence of a stable
market for privacy-differentiated services. We apply and build upon classical game theoretic methods, in particular
the Hotelling model for market segmentation, to quantify the market segmentation. We also generalize the model
to multiple SPs (e.g., Google, DuckDuckGo, and Bing) and illustrate the instability of multi-competitor markets.
A. Related Work
An extensive body of literature on economic models for privacy was recently reviewed by Acquisti et al. [3].
These models illustrate the large semantic range covered by the word “privacy”. Targeted advertising is a common
method for service providers to exploit knowledge of a consumer in a way that can cause privacy violations. Our
work is informed by the literature on targeting strategies for retailers [4]–[13], but rather than optimizing retailer
strategies we are interested in identifying how privacy-differentiated services can address privacy concerns.
The problem of market segmentation is a classic and well-studied problem in microeconomics [14] with focus
on how pricing and product differentiation can lead to a stable and competitive marketplace. However, the free
online services market present a new challenge wherein monetary quantification of both ‘free’ services and the data
collected about consumers is not simple and straightforward. Equally challenging is the quantification of consumer
privacy since it requires capturing the heterogeneous expressions of privacy sensitivity that can range from ‘don’t
care’ at one extreme to ‘hyper vigilant’ at the other. However, some aspects of market models can be brought to
bear to our problem; in particular, the oligopolistic market model with a small number of competitors, barriers to
entry that are not as high as those for monopolies, and with differentiated products fits appropriately for the markets
we are considering wherein two or (a few) more service providers offer products of the same type but differentiated
by QoS and privacy risk.
For a two-player oligopolistic market game, the Cournot-Nash and Bertrand duopoly models are considered
classic models wherein the two firms differentiate using quality and price, respectively. A more nuanced model
that captures differentiation between two firms and consumer preferences is the Hotelling model [15]. This model
captures differentiation between market players by mapping firms to positions on a unit length line such that the
location is indicative of the firm’s ‘differentiation level’, the total line length is reflective of the entire market,
a consumer’s privacy preference is a point on the line, and the optimal locations of the firm resulting from the
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simultaneous game between the players indicate the resulting segmentation. The model captures utility for consumer
as both the advantage (price, quality, etc) from the firm as well as the ‘distance cost’ from the consumer’s location
to that firm. Consumers choose the seller which give them the highest utility (in terms of their valuation of the
product and its price as well as the ‘transportation’ costs). The Hotelling model has also been extended to include
gradations in product (quality) and customer types via a vertical variant of the model [16] .
Privacy and market segmentation. Jentzsch et.al. [10] propose a model to study competitions between two
service providers by taking consumer’s privacy preference (binary choices: low privacy/high privacy) into account
using a vertical Hotelling model. Thus, consumers select the service provider based on their privacy concerns
and the amount of payment to the service provider. They provide analysis of equilibrium strategies for SPs. In
[11], Lee et al. study the influence of privacy protection on the segmentation of a duopoly. In their model, firms
may offer standard and personalized products with personalized prices to three different types of privacy-sensitive
consumers (the ‘unconcerned’ who always share information, ‘pragmatic’ ones who only share if a firm adopts
privacy protection, and the ‘fundamentalists’ who never share data). They show that a privacy-friendly firm can
enlarge market share by attracting more pragmatists to share personal information. From this expansion it can
earn more profits rather than compete with its rival for the other consumers. In contrast to both above-mentioned
models, our model differs in focusing on ‘free’ services, and thus, introduces new models for quantifying QoS- and
privacy-based differentiators; furthermore, our model generalizes the discrete set of privacy sensitive consumers in
[11] to a continuous set of privacy risks thus allowing analysis of over an entire range of privacy expression and
present a more nuanced view of how SPs should offer services to all types of consumers.
B. Our Contributions
Our work introduces a game-theoretic interaction model for free online services offered by two or more SPs with
the goal of understanding whether privacy-differentiated service offerings have the ability to capture market share.
Our model captures a variety of free online services such as search engines, social networking sites, and software
apps that are free, and therefore, use consumer data in a variety of ways for revenue generation. Specifically, our
model is based on the ‘spatial’ Hotelling model wherein the location is now proxy for both the privacy risk levels
that the SPs offer and consumers prefer (both often at odds). The QoS of the service now models the classical
product price. Our model differentiates itself from the Hotelling model in the following sense: unlike the classical
model of non-negative transportation costs from consumer ‘location’ (preference) to either SP ‘location’, a consumer
with a specific privacy risk choice gains from choosing an SP with a lower risk offering and loses from choosing one
with a higher risk offering. This in turn leads to different outcomes than the classical model; we use a three-stage
sequential game to compute the optimal strategies for the SPs and the resulting market share for specific models
of cost and revenue (to SPs), distribution of consumer heterogeneous privacy choices, as well as QoS valuation (to
consumers).
We present closed form solutions for the two SP market with linear valuation functions (cost, revenue, consumer
utility) and a uniform distribution of consumer preferences; for this settings, our results highlight the following: (i)
when consumer place a high value on privacy, it leads to a lower use of private data by SPs, i.e., their advertised
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privacy risk reduces; (ii) SPs offering high privacy risk services are sustainable only if they offer sufficiently high
QoS; (iii) SPs that are capable of differentiating on services that do not directly use consumer data gain larger
market share; and (iv) higher consumer privacy valuation forces SPs with smaller privacy-independent (untargeted)
revenue to offer lower privacy risk service to attract more consumers. In extending the work to more than two SPs,
we illustrate the instability of such markets and highlight the challenges of studying market segmentation for more
than two participants (a problem acknowledged in economics [17]).
C. Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the system model and the non-cooperative game
formulation. The main result for a two-SP market with linear valuation functions are presented in Section III.
Section IV discuss equilibrium results for a market with multiple SPs. Finally, concluding remarks and future work
are provided in Section V.
II. PROBLEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
Our parametrized model detailed below captures the following privacy-differentiated market segmentation prob-
lem: service providers offer free services differentiated by QoS and privacy risks. Online services that are offered
for free often generate revenue by using the data they obtain from their consumers Their gain from using consumer
data is captured by a revenue function and their cost of doing so is captured by a cost function. The goal of
each SP is to choose a QoS and privacy risk tuple that maximizes its profit (difference of revenue and cost). The
hetrogeneous expression of consumer privacy sensitivity is modeled as a (probability) distribution of the population
over a range of privacy risk values. The consumer will choose the SP that maximizes a desired function of QoS,
the privacy risk tolerance of the consumer, and the privacy risk offered by the SP. A stable strategy i.e., a strategy
from which no participant will deviate without reduction in utility, of such a non-cooperative game will yield an
optimal partition (market segmentation) of the consumers. We build upon the classical Hotelling model proposed
by Hotelling in [15] to study market segmentation.
Formally, we introduce a game-theoretic model for two SPs and infinitely many consumers. Each SP offers the
same type of free services (e.g., search engine, social network) with a certain privacy risk guarantee ε and quality
of service (QoS) v. Thus, an SP differentiates its service by a tuple (ε, v) that it advertises to all consumers. The
goal of this work is to determine the fraction of consumers (market segment) that choose each SP when the SPs
offer (ε, v) tuples that maximize their profit.
A. Two-SP Market Model
1) SP Model: We consider two rational (i.e., profit maximization entities) SPs, denoted by SP1 and SP2. Both
SPs provide the same kind of free service; but they differs in the QoS offered. Thus, SP1 and SP2 offer QoS v1 and
v2, respective, where in general v1 6= v2. Furthermore, SP1 and SP2 guarantee that the privacy risk for using their
services is at most ε1 and ε2, respectively, where ε1, ε2 ∈ [0, ε¯]. Without loss of generality, we assume ε2 ≥ ε1.
Under this consumption, SP2 must offer a higher QoS (v2 ≥ v1). Otherwise, its strategy will be dominated by
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its opponent since SP1 will offer both higher QoS and lower privacy risk. For example, SP1 and SP2 could be
Duckduckgo and Google, respectively, in the search engine market, with the QoS given by the accuracy of search
results. On the other hand, the privacy risk can correspond to different guarantees they provide on consumer data
use; e.g., whether they will use consumer data only for statistical purposes or target consumers with tailored ads. We
model this privacy risk guarantee as a variable taking values over a continuous range. In practice, such guarantees
may be coarse granular choices; for example, between completely opting out of the targeting or allowing data use
only for statistical purposes or complete data use only by SP or all possible data usage and sale. We assume that
the SPs generate revenue in two ways: (i) by exploiting the private data of consumers to offer targeted ads and
other services to consumers; and (ii) by providing interested advertisers an online platform to reach consumers.
This latter revenue is independent of private data and simply derived from the revenue capability of the platform.
Let RP (εi) denote the revenue of SPi, i ∈ {1, 2}, resulting from using the private data of consumers and let
RNP,i denote the revenue generated without using consumers’ private information (e.g., from interested advertisers).
The total revenue, R(εi), of SPi from offering privacy guaranteed service is thus
R(εi) = RP (εi) +RNP,i, i ∈ {1, 2}. (1)
In reality, offering free services to consumers often comes with a cost to the SPs, such as the cost of service and
online platform creation and continued operations. Furthermore, we note that free online services profit from using
consumer data and therefore encumber data processing related costs. Let C(vi; εi) denote the cost of offering free
services with privacy risk level εi. We model C(vi; εi) as sum of two non-negative costs: (i) CQoS(vi) of providing
services with QoS vi; and (ii) CP (εi) as the processing (data analytics) cost of exploiting private data to the level
of εi such that
C(vi; εi) = CQoS(vi) + CP (εi), i ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
Thus, via (1) and (2), our model captures the fact that the benefit of using private data by each SP involves both
cost and revenue.
2) Consumer Model: We build upon the classical Hotelling model to formulate both consumer utility and the
resulting consumer-SP game. The Hotelling model maps retailers to two locations (x1, x2) on a [0, 1] line such that
the strategy of each retailer is to determine the best location-price tuple that maximizes its profit. The location (see
Figure 1a) is a proxy for a specific product differentiator. A consumer with its own product differentiator preference
(traditionally assumed to be uniformly distributed over [0, 1]) is mapped to a location x ∈ [0, 1] on the line as shown
in Figure 1a. Such a spatial model allows computing the market segment by identifying both the optimal locations
of the retailers and an indifferent threshold between the two optimal retailer locations at which both retailers are
equally desirable. For such a uniform consumer preference model, the segmentation for each retailer is simply its
distance to the indifference point (see Figure 1a). Consumers choose the retailer with the least product price and
“transportation cost” (modeled as a linear function of location) for a desired consumer valuation of the product.
Note that transportation costs are metaphorical for any non-price-based differentiation of the two retailers.
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For our problem, we obtain a Hotelling model by: (i) introducing a normalized privacy risk and mapping it to
spatial location; and (ii) by viewing the QoS as the net valuation of service by the consumer. Note that since we
study a free services market, we use QoS as a measure of consumer satisfaction. We note that in the classical
Hotelling model, the consumer pays a non-negative transportation cost for any retailer whose location is different
from its own. However, our problem departs from this model in that higher and lower privacy risks offered by SPs
relative to a consumer preferred privacy risk choice are not viewed similarly.
We assume there exists infinitely many rational consumers that are interested in the services provided by the
SPs. In keeping the standard game-theoretic definition, rational refers to consumers interested in maximizing some
measure of utility via interactions with the SPs. We use a random variable E ∈ [0, ε¯] to denote the heterogeneous
privacy choices of consumers; such a model assumes that the privacy preferences of consumers are independent
and identically distributed, a reasonable assumption when the consumer set is very large. Let E = ε denote the
privacy risk preference of a consumer. If an SPi offers a privacy risk guarantee εi higher than ε, then using its
service will result in a privacy cost to the consumer due to perceived privacy risk violation. On the other hand, the
consumer gains from choosing an SPi that offers an εi < ε as a result of the extra privacy protection offered. Let
x = FE(ε) ∈ [0, 1] be a differentiable cumulative distribution function of ε. Thus, x = FE(ε) can be considered as
a normalized privacy risk tolerance (i.e., restricted to [0, 1]) which indicates the proportion of the consumers with
a privacy risk tolerance of at most ε. Since the privacy risk εi can be over an arbitrary range [0, ε¯], the normalized
spatial privacy risk is given by the CDF FE(εi). Thus, for a consumer whose normalized privacy risk tolerance is
located at x ∈ [0, 1], its actual privacy risk tolerance is ε = F−1E (x). We can similarly map the privacy risks offered
by the SPs to normalized locations x1 = FE(ε1) and x2 = FE(ε2) on the [0, 1] line as shown in Figure 1b.
Analogous to the Hotelling model, we let ui(x) denote the utility (in units of QoS) from SPi as perceived
by a consumer with a normalized privacy preference (location) x. Our model for ui(x) contains two parts: (i) a
positive QoS vi offered by SPi; and (ii) the gain or loss in the perceived QoS as a result of a mismatch between
consumer privacy preference and SPi’s privacy risk offering. We introduce a gain factor t that allows mapping the
privacy mismatch t(x− xi)εi to a QoS quantity. This mismatch utility indicates that when the SP offers a service
with privacy risk lower than the consumer’s tolerance, the consumer receives a positive utility due to extra privacy
protection. However, if the service offered has a higher privacy risk than the consumer’s tolerance, the consumer
will receive negative utility for privacy risk violation. In other words, given the same level of QoS, the better the
privacy risk guarantee an SP offers, the more the consumer prefers the SP. We now write the utility or profit function
for both consumers and SPs.
3) Consumer utility and SP profits: For the consumer located at x, the overall perceived utility for choosing
services provided by SP1 and SP2 are
ui(x) = vi + t(x− xi)εi, i ∈ {1, 2}. (3)
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Figure 1: User choice model for using different SPs
For each SPi, i ∈ {1, 2}, let (v−i, ε−i) be its competitor’s strategy. For the revenue and cost models in (1) and
(2), the profit of SPi is simply the difference
pii(vi; εi; v−i; ε−i) = [R(εi)− C(vi; εi)]ni(vi; εi; v−i; ε−i), i ∈ {1, 2}, (4)
where ni(vi; εi; v−i; ε−i) denotes the fraction of consumers who choose SPi.
Modelling Assumption 1: We assume that the services provided by both SPs have non-negative QoS.
Since consumers are rational, they expect to have positive utility through the interactions with the SPs. It is reasonable
to assume that SPs have no incentive to offer services with a negative QoS. In other words, we assume v1 ≥ 0 and
v2 ≥ 0.
Modelling Assumption 2: We assume the model parameters are chosen such that they ensure the market is
completely covered by SP1 and SP2.
The above assumption implies that each consumer must choose one of the SPs. Such an assumption is implicitly
built into the classical Hotelling model to ensure competition between SPs and our model continues to do so too.
Later we provide a sufficient condition for sustaining the equilibrium market segmentation under these assumptions.
B. Two-SP Non-cooperative Game Formulation
We note that the SPs compete against each other through their distinct QoS and privacy risk offerings, which in
turn affects consumer choices and helps determine the stable market segmentation. Thus, the interactions between
SP1 and SP2 can be formulated as a non-cooperative game in which the strategy (action) of each SP is a (privacy
risk, QoS) tuple and that of the consumer is choosing an SP. Furthermore, we assume that the SPs are rational and
have perfect information, implying that they play to maximize their own profits and know the exact profit function
for any given strategy.
The interactions between retailers and consumers in the Hotelling model can be viewed as a sequential game [15].
For our model, such a sequential game involves three stages. In the first stage, the differentiator, i.e. the normalized
privacy risk εi, is advertised by SPi. Thus is followed by each SP determining its QoS for the advertised risk.
Finally, the consumers choose the preferred SP based on the (εi, vi) tuple that maximizes its utility.
The game can be formally described as follows: (i) a set of players {1, 2, C}, where 1 and 2 denote SP1 and SP2,
respectively, and the set C contains infinitely many consumers; (ii) a collection of strategy tuples (εi, vi) ∈ Ei×Vi
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for SPi and a collection of binary choices (strategies) for the consumer b ∈ B = {1, 2}; and (iii) a profit function
pii for each SPi and a utility function ui for each consumer for choosing SPi.
C. The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the Two-SP Game
In a sequential game, each stage is referred to as a subgame [18]. One often associates a strategy profile with
a sequential game. A strategy profile is a vector whose ith entry is the strategy for all players at the ith stage of
the sequential game. A non-cooperative sequential game has one well-studied solution: the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE).
A strategy profile is an SPNE if its entries are the Nash equilibria of the subgame resulting at each stage of the
sequential game. The SPNE of a sequential game captures an equilibrium solution such that no player can make
more profit by unilaterally deviating from this strategy in every subgame.
Since the above non-cooperative game is a game with finite number of stages and perfect information, it can be
solved using backward induction. Backward induction is the process of reasoning backwards in time, starting from
the last stage of the sequential game, to determine a sequence of optimal strategies. It proceeds by first determining
the optimal strategies in the last stage. Using this information, one can then decide the optimal strategies for the
second-to-last stage of the game. This process continues backwards until the optimal strategies for every stage has
been determined. We apply backward induction to the three stage game described above as follows.
Stage 3, Users’ decisions: Each consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] can choose the services provided by either SP1
or SP2 based on its valuation function in (3). The resulting optimal strategy for the consumer is to choose the SP
whose index is given by
arg max
i∈{1,2}
vi + t(x− xi)εi. (5)
Since the consumer’s utility is a linear function of the normalized privacy risk x and the market is completely
covered by the SPs, there exists a threshold xτ such that the consumer located at xτ is indifferent to using services
provided by SP1 or SP2. Thus, at the indifference threshold xτ , we have
u2(xτ ) = u1(xτ ) (6)
=⇒ v2 + t(xτ − x2)ε2 = v1 + t(xτ − x1)ε1.
Simplifying further, the indifference threshold for choosing between the two SPs is given by
xτ =
v1 − v2 + t(FE(ε2)ε2 − FE(ε1)ε1)
t(ε2 − ε1) , (7)
where x1 and x2 have been replaced by their corresponding normalized privacy risk values. Thus, given the SPs’
tuples (εi, vi), i ∈ {1, 2}, the optimal strategy of a consumer located at x is to use the service of SP1 if x ≤ xτ
and SP2 otherwise.
Stage 2, SPs determine QoS: In the second stage, for a given privacy risk guarantee εi, SPi chooses its QoS vi to
maximize its profit pii. Since a consumer’s normalized privacy risk tolerance denotes the fraction of the population
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whose privacy risk tolerance is at most ε, xτ determines the proportion of consumers who choose SP1, i.e., n1.
As a result, the profit functions of SP1 and SP2 can be written as
pi1(v1; ε1; v2; ε2) =[R(ε1)− C(v1; ε1)]v1 − v2 + t(FE(ε2)ε2 − FE(ε1)ε1)
t(ε2 − ε1) , (8)
pi2(v1; ε1; v2; ε2) =[R(ε2)− C(v2; ε2)][1− v1 − v2 + t(FE(ε2)ε2 − FE(ε1)ε1)
t(ε2 − ε1) ]. (9)
To find the SPNE in this stage, we use the best response method [19]. The best response is a function which
captures the behavior of each player while fixing the strategies of the other players. For any v−i ∈ V−i, we define
BRi(v−i) as the best strategy of SPi such that
BRi(v−i) = argmax
vi
pii(vi; εi; v−i; ε−i), i ∈ {1, 2}. (10)
In the Nash equilibrium, each player plays the best response with respect to other players’ strategies. Thus, a Nash
equilibrium in this stage is a profile ~v∗ = (v∗i , v
∗
−i) for which
v∗i ∈ BRi(v−i),∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (11)
To find the Nash equilibria, we first calculate the best response function of each SP, then find a strategy profile ~v∗
for which v∗i ∈ BRi(v−i),∀i ∈ {1, 2}. For a given set of privacy risk guarantees {ε1, ε2}, the optimal QoS v∗i of
SPi, i ∈ {1, 2} in the SPNE is then determined by the solution to the following set of simultaneous equations
v∗1 = argmax
v1
pi1(v1; ε1; v2; ε2),
v∗2 = argmax
v2
pi2(v1; ε1; v2; ε2).
(12)
Stage 1, SPs determine privacy risk guarantee: In the first stage, we compute equilibrium strategies ε1 and ε2
that the two SPs should advertise for optimal market share. Note that xτ , v∗1 , and v
∗
2 have been computed in stages
1 and 2 for a fixed ε1 and ε2, and therefore, are functions of ε1 and ε2. The objective functions pi1 and pi2 are thus
also functions of ε1 and ε2; this in turn implies they can be maximized to find the equilibrium strategy ε∗1 and ε
∗
2
using the best response method.
III. TWO-SP MARKET WITH LINEAR COST AND REVENUE FUNCTIONS
Thus far, we have considered a general model for the consumer distribution of privacy preferences. To obtain
better intuition and meaningful analytical solutions, we consider a linear cost and revenue model for each SP. We
define the cost function of SPi to be
C(vi; εi) = cvi + cλεi, i ∈ {1, 2}, (13)
where c and λ are constant scale factors in units of cost/QoS and QoS/privacy risk, respectively. In addition, we
model the revenue of each SP from offering a privacy guaranteed service by a linear function
R(εi) = rεi + pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, (14)
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where r is the revenue per unit privacy risk for using consumers’ private data. The parameters p1 and p2 model
the fixed revenues of the SPs that are independent of consumers’ private data.
A. Consumers with Uniformly Distributed Privacy Risk Tolerance
We assume consumers have uniformly distributed privacy risk tolerance between 0 and ε¯. The resulting normalized
privacy risk of each SP is given by
xi = FE(εi) =
εi
ε¯
, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let
α =
r
c
− λ (15)
and
C˜ = ctε¯. (16)
Note that α is the ratio of net profit from using consumer data for a unit of privacy risk to the cost for providing
a unit of QoS. Furthermore, C˜ is the cost of providing non-zero utility to the consumer with a maximal mismatch
of privacy risk (relative to SP).
By using the backward induction method, the computed SPNE of the two-SP non-cooperative game is presented
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: There exists an SPNE for the two-SP non-cooperative game if the model parameters {c, α, t, ε¯, p1, p2}
satisfy
−1 ≤ 16(p2 − p1)
9ctε¯
≤ 1, (17)
4α− 3t
3t
≤ 16(p2 − p1)
9ctε¯
≤ 4α− t
3t
, (18)
(12cαε¯)2 − (15ctε¯)2 + 288ctε¯(p2 + p1) ≥ [16(p2 − p1)]2. (19)
The closed form solution of the SPNE is given by
ε∗2 =
12ε¯cα+ 15ctε¯− 16(p2 − p1)
24tc
, (20)
v∗2 =
(2α+ t)cα6ε¯+ (α− t)9ctε¯+ (t− 2α)8p2 + (α+ t)16p1
24ct
, (21)
ε∗1 = ε
∗
2 −
3ε¯
4
, (22)
v∗1 = v
∗
2 −
3ε¯
4
α+
p2 − p1
3c
. (23)
At the equilibrium, i.e., for the SPNE, 12 − 8(p2−p1)9ctε¯ of the population choose the service provided by SP1 while
the remaining 12 +
8(p2−p1)
9ctε¯ of the population choose SP2. The total profit of SP1 and SP2 are given by
pi∗1 =
4c
27tε¯
(
9tε¯
8
− 2(p2 − p1)
c
)2;pi∗2 =
4c
27tε¯
(
9tε¯
8
+
2(p2 − p1)
c
)2.
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The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.
In theorem 1, we observe ε2 = ε1 + 34 ε¯, which implies for any SPNE strategy profile, the SP who with the higher
QoS will offer a privacy risk guarantee 34 ε¯ more than its competitor. Furthermore, a higher maximum net profit
for using private data, denoted by cαε¯, encourages SPs to offer higher privacy risk guarantees. However, a larger
difference in revenues independent of private information between SP1 and SP2, denoted by p2 − p1, encourages
SPs to lower their privacy risk guarantees to attract more consumers with lower privacy risk tolerance. Also, a
larger C˜ will result in a larger differentiation in privacy risk guarantee in the equilibrium strategies of SP1 and
SP2. Finally, as p2 − p1 increases, the market share of SP1 decreases while SP2’s market share increases.
By (16), xτ , pi∗1 , and pi
∗
2 can be simplified to
xτ =
1
2
− 8(p2 − p1)
9C˜
. (24)
pi∗2 =
1
3
(
3
4
√
C˜+
4(p2 − p1)
3
√
C˜
)2 pi∗1 =
1
3
(
3
4
√
C˜ − 4(p2 − p1)
3
√
C˜
)2 (25)
Note that for a fixed p2−p1, both pi∗1 and pi∗2 are decreasing functions of C˜ when C˜ ∈ [0, 16(p2−p1)9 ] and increasing
afterwards. On the other hand, by (17), we have 16(p2−p1)9 ≤ ctε¯, which implies C˜ ≥ 16(p2−p1)9 . Therefore, both
pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 are increasing function of C˜ in the SPNE. This indicates both SPs will make more profits in the SPNE
with a larger C˜.
B. Consumers with Normally Distributed Privacy Risk Tolerance
In this section, we model consumers’ privacy tolerance as a random variable E that follows a normal distribution
N ( ε¯2 , σ2) with a mean of ε¯2 and a standard deviation of σ. Since E ∈ [0, ε¯], we restricted the normal distribution
to lie within the interval [0, ε¯]. Then E conditional on E ∈ [0, ε¯] follows a truncated normal distribution with
cumulative distribution function
FE(ε) =

Φ(
ε− ε¯
2
σ )−Φ(− ε¯2σ )
Φ( ε¯2σ )−Φ(− ε¯2σ )
ε ∈ [0, ε¯]
0 ε ∈ [−∞, 0]
1 ε ∈ [ε¯,+∞]
, (26)
where Φ(y) denotes the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
In contrast to the uniform distribution case, the CDF in (26) is not amenable to a closed form solution. Thus,
we characterize the equilibrium numerically. To find the SPNE, we first compute the SPNE QoS in the second
stage as functions of privacy risk guarantees by solving (12). Then, we use an iterated best response method to
find the optimal privacy risk guarantee of an SP by fixing other SPs strategies in each iteration. When the process
converges, we have found an SPNE in which no SP is better off by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium.
C. Illustration of Results
In this section, we illustrate our model and results. First, we assume consumers have uniformly distributed
privacy risk tolerance. We plot each SP’s SPNE strategies, market share, and total profit with respect to consumers’
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maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of the QoS/privacy risk scale factor t. Later, we study the
model in which consumers’ privacy risk tolerance follows a normal distribution N ( ε¯2 , 1) truncated between 0 and
ε¯. The model parameters are given as follows:
Parameter c λ r p1 p2
Value 0.5 0.75 0.7 0.4 0.8
Table. I: Numerical Example Model Parameters
1) Consumers with Uniformly Distributed Privacy Risk Tolerance: In this section, we vary ε¯ from 3 to 5 to
study properties of SPNE. Note that by theorem 1, t must belong to [0.58, 0.85] for a stable and sustainable SPNE.
In Figure 2, we plot the equilibrium strategies of different SPs. Observe that both privacy risks and QoSs are linear
functions of ε¯, as expected for the linear model assumed. Furthermore, it can be seen that as t, the valuation of
privacy by consumer, decreases, each SP will increase its privacy risk to generate more profit from using private
data. Correspondingly, the SPs will have to provide higher QoS to attract consumers.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies of SPs vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of the
QoS/privacy risk scale factor t under a uniform distribution of consumer privacy risk
The market shares of different SPs in the SPNE are presented in Figure 3. We observe that the equilibrium market
share of SP2 decreases as t increases. The intuition behind this is that if t increases, the consumer’s valuation of
privacy mismatch also increases. Thus, it is more difficult for SP2 to attract consumers with privacy tolerance lower
than ε2. As a result, its market share decreases. Notice that in Figure 3, as ε¯ decreases, the equilibrium market share
of SP2 also increases. This is because consumers experience a smaller negative utility from the mismatch between
their preferred and the offered privacy risk when the net range is smaller (recall that the utility from mismatch is
given by t(x−xi)εi, εi ∈ [0, ε¯]). Thus, SP2 has the incentive to offer high QoS with high privacy risk. As a result,
more consumers will choose the SP with a higher privacy risk to enjoy a higher QoS.
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Figure 3: Market shares of SPs at SPNE vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of the
QoS/privacy risk scale factor t under a uniform distribution of consumer privacy risk
In Figure 4, we plot the total profit at the SPNE for each SP as a function of the maximum consumer privacy
risk tolerance ε¯ for different values of t. As shown in the figure, the total profit of both SPs at SPNE increases as
ε¯ increases. This is due to the fact that a larger ε¯ indicates a larger range of consumer preferences, and then, more
possibilities for the SPs to exploit private information. Thus, both SPs can benefit from the using the private data
of consumers that have a higher privacy risk tolerance. As t decreases, the total profit of both SPs decrease. This
is due to the fact that as t decreases, the SPs intend to increase their privacy risks to generate more profit, As a
result, the QoS of each SP increases to attract more consumers (see Figure 2), that in turn has the consequence of
increasing the cost of providing services. Thus, the SPs have lower profits.
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Figure 4: Total equilibrium profit of SPs vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of the
QoS/privacy risk scale factor t under a uniform distribution of consumer privacy risk
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2) Consumers with Normally Distributed Privacy Risk Tolerance: We now consider the case in which consumers’
privacy risk tolerance follows a truncated normal distribution with a mean of ε¯2 and a standard deviation of 1. The
equilibrium strategies of different SPs are shown in Figure 5. As with the uniform distribution scenario, here too
we observe that the privacy risk and the QoS offered by each SP are linear functions of ε¯. We also notice that in
the SPNE, SP2 will always provide service with maximum privacy risk (Figure 5a). This is because the truncated
normal distribution forces SP2 to forfeit privacy differentiation while maximizing its profit. This allows SP1 to
gain an advantage (relative to the uniform distribution). Furthermore, we observe that the value of t has slightly
less influence on strategies of SPs in the SPNE compared to uniformly distributed consumer privacy tolerance.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium strategies of SPs vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of t
under truncated normal privacy risk tolerance distribution
Figure 6 shows market shares of different SPs at SPNE vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for
different values of t under truncated normal privacy tolerance distribution. As t decreases, the market share of SP2
at SPNE increases, and vice versa. Also, when ε¯ decreases, the equilibrium market share of SP1 also decreases.
Furthermore, it can be seen that for the same ε¯, the market share of SP2 (SP1) is smaller (larger) when consumers’
privacy tolerance follows the truncated normal distribution compared to uniform distribution. Furthermore, our
numerical analysis shows that at SPNE, SP2 is forced to provide service with maximum privacy risk. We argue
that this is due to the shape of the distribution that limits the number of consumers at the two extremes thus
compelling the two SPs compete for the large bulk of consumers distributed around ε¯/2. Given the ability of SP2
to make more profit on untargeted services relative to SP1, the SPNE solution leads to SP1 increasing its market
share to be profitable and SP2 achieving profitability with a smaller market share.
The relationship between total profit of different SPs at SPNE vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance
for different values of t is shown in Figure 7. Similar to Figure 4, both SPs’ total profit increases as ε¯ increases.
However, in contrast to Figure 4, as t decreases, the total profit of SP2 increases. This is because SP2 always
offers ε¯ in the SPNE. Notice that SP2’s equilibrium QoS is also a linear function of ε (see Figure 5b). On the
14
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Figure 6: Market shares of SPs at SPNE vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of t
under truncated normal privacy tolerance distribution
other hand, SP2’s market share increases as t decreases (see Figure 6). By (4), (13), and (14); the total profit of
SP2 increases as t decreases.
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Figure 7: Total equilibrium profit of SPs vs. consumers’ maximum privacy risk tolerance for different values of t
under truncated normal privacy risk tolerance distribution
IV. MARKET WITH MULTIPLE SERVICE PROVIDERS
In the previous sections, we studied the market with two SPs. In this section, we examine a generalized model
with multiple SPs (Figure 8). We allow for a finitely arbitrary number of SPs, each of which offers the same type
of free service but with different QoS and privacy risk guarantee to consumers. In particular, we assume there are
m SPs in the market. Our models for cost, revenue and utility for each SP as well as the consumers are the same
as for the two-SP model described in Section II-A3. Furthermore, we assume a consumer’s privacy risk tolerance
is uniformly distributed between [0, ε]. Analogous to the two SP model, the interactions between the m SPs and
consumers can also be viewed as a non-cooperative sequential game. The m-SP game proceeds in three stages.
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In the first stage, each of the m SPs chooses its own privacy risk guarantee resulting in a vector ~ε = (ε1, ε2, ..., εm)
(on the interval [0, ε¯]). Without loss of generality, we assume ε1 ≤ ε2 ≤ ... ≤ εm. At the second stage, given the
privacy risk ~ε determined in the first stage, the SPs simultaneously determine their QoS values to obtain a vector
~v = {v1, v2, ..., vm}. At the last stage, each consumer chooses the SP that yields the maximal perceived utility for
the consumer.
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Figure 8: Market model for multiple SPs offering services with privacy guarantee
To find the SPNE, we apply backward induction to the three stage game described above as follows. In the
last stage of the game, for fixed QoS and privacy risk guarantee strategies of the SPs, consumers’ choices of SPs
are determined by their privacy risk tolerances. In the two-SP case, the consumer located at xτ divides the set
of consumers into two convex subsets where the consumers in the left subset will choose SP1 and vice versa.
However, for the multiple SP case, the market share of SPi (i ∈ {1, ...,m}) is not necessarily a convex set between
the indifference threshold in which consumers are indifferent to choosing SPi−1 or SPi and the threshold in which
consumers are indifferent to choosing SPi or SPi+1. This is due to the fact that in general the problem requires
each SPi to compete with all other SPs, even if their privacy risk offerings are very different (e.g., SPs with a large
difference in locations in Figure 8). We note that this will not happen in the equilibrium since an SP with zero
market share would be better off by either improving its QoS to attract some consumers or just exit the market.
Therefore, in the equilibrium, each SP only competes directly with its two closest neighbors. For given QoS profile
~v = {v1, v2, ..., vm} and privacy risk profile ~ε = (ε1, ..., εm), the market share of each SP are
n1 =
v1 − v2 + t(FE(ε2)ε2 − FE(ε1)ε1)
t(ε2 − ε1) ,
ni =
vi − vi+1 + t(FE(εi+1)εi+1 − FE(εi)εi)
t(εi+1 − εi) −
vi−1 − vi + t(FE(εi)εi − FE(εi−1)εi−1)
t(εi − εi−1) ,
i ∈ {2, ...,m− 1},
nm = 1− vm−1 − vm + t(FE(εm)εN − FE(εm−1)εm−1)
t(εm − εm−1) .
Furthermore, we define the objective functions of SPi to be
pii(~ε;~v) = [R(εi)− C(vi; εi)]ni(~ε;~v), i ∈ {1, ...,m}.
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For a given privacy risk guarantees profile ~ε, the optimal QoS of SPi (i ∈ {1, ...,m}) is determined by
argmax
vi
pii(~ε;~v), i ∈ {1, ...,m} (27)
while fixing all other players’ strategies.
We note that the cost function C(vi; εi) and the market segmentation computed in the first stage are both linear
functions of vi. Thus, for a fixed privacy risk guarantee profile ~ε, the objective functions of SPi in this stage
is a concave function with respect to its own strategy vi. Furthermore, the feasible set of each SP’s strategy
is a convex set. Thus, the non-cooperative game among the SPs in this stage can is a m-player concave game.
By [20], there exists a Nash equilibrium. We define δi , 1t(εi+1−εi) , y1 , r(ε1) + p1 − cλε1 − ctx2ε2 + ctx1ε1,
yN , r(εN ) + pN − cλεN − ct(1 − xN )εN + ct(1 − xN−1)εN−1 and yi , r(εi)+pi−cλεi+ctxiεi−ctxi+1εi+1t(εi+1−εi) +
r(εi)+pi−cλεi−ctxi−1εi−1+ctxiεi
t(εi−εi−1) ∀i ∈ {2, ...,m}. Applying the first order condition to SPs’ profit functions (solving
simultaneous linear equations obtained from ∂pii(~ε;~v)∂vi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}) yields the equilibrium strategies
v∗1 =
v2
2
+
y1
2c
, (28)
v∗i =
cvi+1δi + cvi−1δi−1 + yi
2c[δi + δi−1]
, i ∈ {2, ..,m}, (29)
v∗m =
vm−1
2
+
ym
2c
. (30)
In the last stage, the SPs determine their privacy risk guarantees ~ε by considering equilibrium strategies in
previous stages (ni and v∗i ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}) as functions of ~ε. Therefore, the optimal privacy risk strategy of SPi
is determine by
argmax
εi
pii(~ε;~v), i ∈ {1, ...,m} (31)
while fixing all other players’ strategies. For reasons of intractability (solving highly parameterized high order
polynomial equations), a full characterization of privacy risk equilibria could not be achieved. Thus, we characterizes
the SPNE numerically by using the iterated best response method. We consider a three-SP market and adopt the
model parameters presented in Table I. Furthermore, we assume t = 0.7 and ε¯ = 5. The initial privacy risk of
SPi is given by iε¯i+1 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Although there exists an SPNE in the second stage of the sequential game
for fixed privacy guarantees, the existence of an equilibrium in the first stage can not be guaranteed.
The best response strategies of the SPs for different values of SP2’s privacy independent revenue are plotted in
Figure 9. It can be seen that the two SPs with lower privacy risks proceed to jump over each other in each round of
best response iteration, attempting to lower its privacy risk to attract more consumers from its competitor. The SP
with the highest revenue independent of using private data adopts a high privacy risk strategy to focus on consumers
with high privacy risk tolerance and exploiting their private data extensively. Furthermore, we observe that when
p2 is large, SP3’s privacy risk strategy is also higher on average. On the other hand, SP1’s best response strategy
is lower. The intuition behind is that a larger p2 allows SP2 to set a higher privacy risk to make more profit from
using consumer data. This forces SP3 to increase its privacy risk to differentiate itself from SP2. On the other
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Figure 9: Best response of each SP’s privacy risk for different values of SP2’s revenue independent of using private
data
hand, a higher privacy risk of SP2 will encourage SP1 to lower its privacy risk to attract more consumers.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our work seeks to understand the effect of offering privacy- and QoS- differentiated online services on consumers
with heterogeneous expressions of privacy sensitivity. We have quantified this effect as the fraction of consumers
that prefer lower privacy risks with the accompanying lower QoS to the alternative of higher risks and higher QoS.
We have presented an analysis built upon the classical Hotelling model to compute these fractions for both the two
and multi SP problem. Analogous to the classical segmentation models, our problem also involves parameters that
capture cost, revenue, and consumer valuation functions that are dependent and independent of the privacy risks.
While such parametrized model can make the analysis challenging, our results for relatively simple yet meaningful
functions such as linear cost models and uniform (as well as truncated Gaussian) distribution of consumer preferences
suggests that SPs that have higher profits from untargeted services have an edge in the market. SPs competing on
offering lower privacy risks have to offer better QoS or figure out other means of increasing untargeted revenue
to gain market share. The market segmentation model assumes at least two or more SPs were able to overcome
the barrier to entry and differentiate themselves. Thus, a related question we will address going forward is whether
such barriers to entry are in fact surmountable when competitors use privacy as a differentiator. These analyses are
crucial for developing better privacy policies to effectively enable safe and secure online commerce.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Starting form the last stage in which consumers choose different SPs, we use backward induction to find the
SPNE of the sequential game. In the last stage, each consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] chooses an SP which maximize
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its utility function (3). By (7) and the assumption that consumers’ privacy risk tolerances are uniformly distributed,
the indifference threshold xτ is given by
xτ =
v1 − v2 + t(ε
2
2−ε21)
ε¯
t(ε2 − ε1) = n1(v1; ε1; v2; ε2). (32)
At the second stage, the optimal strategy of each SP is determined by the solution of (12). For fixed privacy
risk guarantees ε2 and ε1, the objective function of SPi, i ∈ {1, 2} in this stage, i.e. pii(vi; εi; v−i; ε−i), is a
concave function with respect to its own strategy vi. Furthermore, the feasible set of SPi’s strategy is a convex
set (vi ∈ [0,+∞]). Thus, the non-cooperative subgame between SP2 and SP1 in this stage can be considered as a
two-player concave game. By Theorem 1 and 2 in [20], we can establish
Proposition 1: For fixed privacy risk strategies, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game between SP2
and SP1 at the second stage.
To compute the equilibrium strategy of the second stage, we first substitute (13), (14), and (32) into (9) and (8).
Then, we apply the first order condition to SPs’ profit functions and solve the simultaneous equations given by
∂pii(vi; εi; v−i; ε−i)
∂vi
= 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (33)
Solving the above simultaneous equations yields
v1 =
rε1 + p1
2c
+
v2 − λε1 − tx2ε2 + tx1ε1
2
, (34)
v2 =
rε2 + p2
2c
+
v1 − λε2 − t(1− x2)ε2 + t(1− x1)ε1
2
. (35)
For given privacy guarantees ε1, and ε2, solving the simultaneous linear equations above by substituting (34) into
(35) yields the equilibrium strategies
v∗1(ε2, ε1) =
2(rε1 + p1) + rε2 + p2
3c
+
t(1 + x1)ε1 − λ(ε2 + 2ε1)− t(1 + x2)ε2
3
, (36)
v∗2(ε2, ε1) =
2(rε2 + p2) + rε1 + p1
3c
+
t(2− x1)ε1 − λ(2ε2 + ε1)− t(2− x2)ε2
3
. (37)
At the first stage, the SPs determine their optimal privacy risk by considering the QoS of each SP and the market
segmentation computed in previous stages as functions of privacy risks offered by the SPs. By substituting (37)
and (36) into (9) and (8), the profit functions of the SPs can be written as
pi2 =
c
9t(ε2 − ε1) [
p2 − p1
c
+ (
r
c
− λ+ t2ε¯− ε2 − ε1
ε¯
)(ε2 − ε1)]2, (38)
pi1 =
c
9t(ε2 − ε1) [−
p2 − p1
c
+ (−r
c
+ λ+ t
ε¯+ ε2 + ε1
ε¯
)(ε2 − ε1)]2. (39)
Next, we apply the first order condition to SPs’ profit functions to compute the equilibrium strategies. Taking the
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derivatives of pi2 and pi1 with respect to ε2 and ε1 and set both of their values to 0 yields
∂pi2
∂ε2
=
c[( rc − λ+ t 2ε¯−ε2−ε1ε¯ )(ε2 − ε1) + p2−p1c ][( rc − λ+ t 2ε¯−3ε2+ε1ε¯ )(ε2 − ε1)− p2−p1c ]
9t(ε2 − ε1)2 = 0, (40)
∂pi1
∂ε1
=
c[(− rc + λ+ t ε¯+ε2+ε1ε¯ )(ε2 − ε1)− p2−p1c ][( rc − λ− t ε¯−ε2+3ε1ε¯ )(ε2 − ε1)− p2−p1c ]
9t(ε2 − ε1)2 = 0. (41)
Solving the two simultaneous equations above yields
(
r
c
− λ+ t2ε¯− ε2 − ε1
ε¯
)(ε2 − ε1) + p2 − p1
c
= 0 (42)
or
(
r
c
− λ+ t2ε¯− 3ε2 + ε1
ε¯
)(ε2 − ε1)− p2 − p1
c
= 0 (43)
and
(−r
c
+ λ+ t
ε¯+ ε2 + ε1
ε¯
)(ε2 − ε1)− p2 − p1
c
= 0 (44)
or
(
r
c
− λ− t ε¯− ε2 + 3ε1
ε¯
)(ε2 − ε1)− p2 − p1
c
= 0. (45)
We note that the strategies given by (42) and (44) result in 0 profits in (38) and (39). This indicates the privacy
risk determined by (42) and (44) are strictly dominated by the strategies given by the solution of (43) and (45).
Solving (43) and (45) yields the equilibrium privacy risk (20) and
ε∗1 =
12ε¯cα− 3ctε¯− 16(p2 − p1)
24tc
. (46)
By subtracting (46) from (20), we have (22). Substitute the solution of ε∗2 and ε
∗
1 to (37) and (36), we have (21)
and
v∗1 =
(2α− t)cα6ε¯+ (α− 3t)3ctε¯+ (t− α)16p2 + (2α+ t)8p1
24ct
. (47)
Subtracting (47) from (21) yields (23).
Next, we prove the sufficient condition for the existence of the above SPNE. First of all, the model parameters
must sustain a competitive market environment. Thus, in the equilibrium, each SP must have non-zero market share.
This indicates the parameters must satisfy 0 ≤ x∗τ = v
∗
1−v∗2+t(x∗2ε∗2−x∗1ε∗1)
t(ε∗2−ε∗1) ≤ 1. Substitute (20), (21), (22), and (23)
into the above inequality, we have (17). Furthermore, in the SPNE, the QoS of each SP must be non-negative (QoS
feasibility) and the privacy risk guarantees must be bounded between 0 and ε¯ (privacy risk feasibility). By the
model assumption in Section II-A1, we have ε1 ≤ ε2. Thus, we only requires ε2 ≤ ε¯ and ε1 ≥ 0. Substitute (20)
and (22) into the two inequalities above yields (18). Let x∗i =
ε∗i
ε¯ , i ∈ {A,B} denote the normalized privacy risk
of each SP in the SPNE. The equilibrium strategies must satisfy the complete market coverage condition given by
ui(x) = v
∗
i − t(x− x∗i )ε∗i ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [0, 1] for at least one i ∈ {A,B}.
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Substituting (18) into (23), we have v∗2 −v∗1 = 3ε¯4 α− p2−p13c ≥ 3tε¯16 + 2(p2−p1)3c > 0, thus we only need v1 ≥ 0 for
QoS feasibility. Furthermore, the Hotelling model feasibility condition implies v∗1−tx∗1ε∗1 ≥ v∗2−tx∗2ε∗2. Since ui(x)
is an increasing function of x, complete market coverage condition can be simplified to u1(0) ≥ 0. As a result,
the QoS feasibility condition and the complete market coverage condition can be simplified to v∗1 − tx∗1ε∗1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the sufficient condition for the existence of SPNE is given by:
1) 0 ≤ v∗1−v∗2+t(x∗2ε2−x∗1ε1)t(ε∗2−ε∗1) ≤ 1,
2) 0 ≤ ε∗1, ε∗2 ≤ ε¯,
3) v∗1 − tx∗1ε∗1 ≥ 0.
Solving the above three inequalities yield (17), (18), and (19). The equilibrium market share and profits of the SPs
are obtained by substituting (20), (21), (22), and (23) into (7), (8), and (9).
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